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How Does Downstream Firms’ Efficiency Affect Exclusive Supply Agreements?

Kitamura, Hiroshi 大阪大学

2023.11.30

概要

We often observe exclusive supply contracts between an input supplier and a final
product producer in antitrust cases. For example, a large-scale pharmaceutical company enforced 10-year exclusive supply agreements for an essential ingredient.1
In the relationship between a final good producer and retailers, an established toy
retailer also prevented toy manufacturers from selling to warehouse clubs.2 More
recently, an online gaming company prohibited mobile game developers from providing their games through a rival online gaming company.3
Despite these observations, in the literature of anticompetitive exclusive dealing,
many papers focus on exclusion in upstream markets. This study focuses on exclusion in downstream markets.
We construct a model of anticompetitive exclusive supply agreements in which a
downstream incumbent prevents an upstream supplier from selling inputs to a potential downstream entrant whose efficiency is higher than the incumbent in terms of
the amount of necessary inputs produced by the upstream supplier. We can interpret
the efficiency difference as differences in the defect rate in the relationships between
an input supplier and final product producers. The technology difference can also
be explained by lower input use or lower wasted materials. The source of such efficiency differences can become a crucial issue for the upstream supplier because the
efficiency of downstream firms can affect the demand for the input that is produced
by the upstream supplier.
Under linear wholesale pricing (Iozzi & Valletti, 2014), we show that the downstream incumbent can deter socially efficient entry through exclusive supply contracts even in the simplest setting, where a single seller, buyer, and entrant exist.
More specifically: When the entrant and incumbent have similar efficiency levels,
we never have exclusion results; however, as the entrant’s efficiency increases, exclusion can occur. The results imply that anticompetitive exclusive supply agreements
are possible when the downstream entrant has a lower defect rate or other significant
efficiency advantage vis-à-vis the downstream incumbent.
To understand our results, consider the impact of socially efficient entry: Socially
efficient entry generates downstream competition and increases the final product
output, which increases the demand for inputs that are produced by the upstream
supplier and, consequently, its profit. However, as the entrant becomes more efficient, it demands a smaller quantity of the input that is produced by the upstream
supplier. Therefore, the entry does not significantly increase the input demand. ...

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